International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 - 8887)
Volume 71 - No. 21, June 2013

Performance analysis and classification of Clone attack detection procedures in mobile wireless sensor networks

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ABSTRACT

Regarding accelerating development of mobile sensor nodes technology, increasing the utilization of them, and also facing with security challenges in these networks; specially clone nodes attack, this paper focuses on exploiting optimum criteria of node clone intrusion detection procedures in mobile wireless sensor networks by using experimental analysis of procedures. Since many of recommended protocols in this area have not been experimentalised, also no comprehensive study has been performed on the possibility and capability of these procedures; in this paper all types of sensor network architecture, with the presence of mobile sensor node, are analyzed. Then according to the type of architecture, the procedures of clone node intrusion detection is classified and meticulously scrutinized. Besides, due to measuring the efficiency, exploiting the optimum parameters and also appraising the expenses of procedures, via using OMNeT++ simulator, these procedures are analyzed by comprehensive simulation. Finally, the conclusion based on theoretical analysis and simulation is presented.

General Terms:

Performance,Security

Keywords:

wireless sensor network (WSN), clone attack, intrusion detection, mobility

1. INTRODUCTION

Utilizing WSNs in different environments, such as medical and military areas, because of the inexpensiveness, self-organizing and not needing constant supervision of sensor nodes is increasing. Because lack of physical shield layer on these nodes and utilize them in enemy environment without protection, usually these networks expose to different internal and external attacks [1]-[4]. The limited energy and memory sources of these sensor nodes, because the security challenges in these networks are to encounter more complexity compared to other mobile telecommunication networks. These complexities are significantly increasing, if the sensor nodes have mobility. Regarding the structure and architecture of WSNs among different attacks introduced in papers [1]-[7], because of the clone node attacks capability in passing through encrypting layer and authentication and also proper conditions for other attacks, these attacks are considered as the most serious security threat for the WSNs. In clone node attacks, the attacker first compromises the network sensor node and then by using side channel attacking techniques exploits the information on the node in a certain amount of time and finally uploads the information on any number of nodes. Now the attacker can make any type of attack on the network through taking the control of these nodes. Because after compromising the node, the attacker exploits the confidential information, including secret keys and uploads it on other clone nodes. From point of view of other nodes, the clone nodes seem to be valid. To avoid these types of attacks, new defensive solutions are required as a second security layer. Regarding the importance of this subject, many researchers have focused their efforts on it and a large number of procedures have been recommended for this attack. By analyzing various procedures, it can be observed that different criteria and variant methods and sometimes impractical hypotheses, in which simulation by real conditions such as the life of the battery, lower layer protocol and real mobility models can clearly prove this point, are considered. .Furthermore, choosing criteria, hypotheses, and as the result, proper detection procedure in the networks is essential. What we know so far, no precise and experimental investigation has been implemented on WSNs with mobile nodes, so due to the requirements and vast domain of architectures and WSNs configuration, this paper concentrates on this type of network. In section2 , based on the presence of the mobile wireless sensor node, different types of configurations are evaluated. Then according to the type of wireless sensor nodes (both static and mobile) a new classification is suggested, and the hypotheses and the capabilities of the attacker and the network in each configuration is described. Moreover, following that, with regarding to effective criteria and parameters, the intrusion detection procedures in mobile WSNs will be mentioned and precisely investigated. In fact, WSNs with mobile node are classified into three categories: static WSN with mobile attacker, static WSN with mobile intrusion detection nodes and mobile wireless sensor network. The intrusion strategy is divided by using the criteria in which it must be either centralized or distributed, either homogeneous or hierarchical of the network structure. In section3 , the intrusion detection procedures in WSN with mobile nodes, by taking account of the criterion of section2 are accurately analyzed. In section4 classification is carried out based on theoretical analysis. In section5 , for the purpose of assessment and experimental analysis of the clone node intrusion detection in WSNs with mobile nodes, first the basic hypotheses and models similar to real conditions are mentioned and then by using network simulator software OMNeT++, different intrusion procedures are investigated. At the end by extensive simulations, the comparative results are presented. In section6, the conclusions of the theoretical analysis and simulation are presented.



Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of all types of wireless sensor networks in terms of nodes mobility

2. NETWORK AND ATTACKER MODEL

2.1 network model

The WSN usually contains hundreds and sometimes thousands of cheap and small size wireless sensor nodes which are accidentally or in a pre-designed way distributed in a vast geographic area. In WSNs it is assumed that every moment there is the possibility that a number of sensor nodes get lost or be added to the network [1]. While in old networks, all the sensor nodes are static and have a base station for gathering data, today, respecting the robotics technology advancement and the emergence of mobile wireless sensor nodes, the structure of sensor networks has been changed. Different types of sensor networks with the combination of mobile and static are illustrated in Fig.(1).
Therefore, here it is assumed that wireless sensor nodes are mobile and regarding this criterion, the networks are considered based on below architectures;

(i) Mobile-WSN (MWSN): in this network all of the nodes have mobile capability;
(ii) WSN with mobile attacker: in this network all of the network sensor nodes are static but the attacker has mobile capability;
(iii) WSN with mobile intrusion detection node: in this network all of the network sensor nodes are static but the intrusion detector nodes have mobile capability;

Besides, here in hybrid networks it is supposed that mobile nodes have more potential and sources compared to static nodes. Because of the more intensity of security challenges in homogeneous networks, the general architecture of homogeneous networks is considered.

2.2 attacker model

With referencing to the definition of clone node attack [7]-[9], in this attack, the attacker compromises between one or some network nodes and exploits their stored information and replicates a preferred number of nodes from a certain node with specific identity and places them in appropriate locations in network, so that respecting the desired goals, it will be able to make different attacks including, eavesdropping, DoS, inject fake data and attacking the network protocols. Also it is assumed that the attacker is not able to allocate a new identity to the clone nodes and mostly the attacker can only compromise a small part of the network nodes. Otherwise, with referencing to clone attacks costs, there is no need for node replicate. In addition, it is assumed that the attacking nodes can communicate and even collude with each other. It is also possible that the attacker nodes have more capability and flexibility compared to the valid nodes of the network which is a reasonable hypothesis. Finally, it is supposed that the attacker nodes can use various mobility models for moving in the network. But, due to the RWM model is comprehensive and ideal, in this paper it is assumed that the attacker utilizes this model. Indeed, from a general point of view, the attacker node can be either mobile or static in the network.

2.3 Framework for clone node intrusion detection

Regarding to the point that in clone node attack, first the attacker compromises one or some nodes and then exploits the information, second, by reprogramming the information in desired number of nodes, next, places it in appropriate location in order to fulfill the desired goals. Therefore, after the attack is implemented by the attacker, the clone node requires a reciprocal link between itself and the neighbors, then shares the session keys for creating secured link and eavesdrops the information which is sent by neighbors and attacks controlling protocol in the network. But before creating all these communications, all the nodes added to the network are forced to pass through intrusion detection protocol as the second security layer. In other words unless the attacker nodes have not passed the intrusion detection process, they are not able to fulfill their malicious goals. According to this framework, the attacker for being successful and reaching is desired goals should pass the detection protocols designed for the wireless sensor network. Consequently, real and exact analysis of the protocols and intrusion criteria, regarding the limitations of the WSN and simulating them with real protocol layers are essential. Hence, initially, these procedures are theoretically analyzed and classified. Also in order to assess the performance procedures with real hypotheses, the procedures are extensively simulated and experimental analyses are presented according to simulation.

3. INTRUSION DETECTION PROCEDURES IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS WITH MOBILE NODE

Regarding the hypotheses of the network model, in this paper, network configurations, in terms of combination of sensor nodes, are divided into three categories:

(i) All the nodes of mobile wireless network;
(ii) mobile attacker node;
(iii) Mobile detection node;

Then the suggested procedures, based on the criteria of being centralized or distributed, local detection or involvement of the whole network in detection process, or being based on conflict with more details are divided. Thus, from Fig.2. it can be observed that the intrusion procedures based on detection method, performing strategy and detection criterion, are divided.

3.1 Clone node detection procedures in mobile wireless sensor network

While all the nodes of WSN have mobility, considering the mentioned criteria in section 2, the clone node detection attack procedures are divided as follow:

3.1.1 Locally-distributed detection procedures, based on conflict. According to our knowledge, first time in [12], a distributed clone detection procedure named as XED, has been proposed for MWSNs. Regarding to the previous experiences, because of high communication overhead in selecting witness nodes, energy limitations and continuous routing changes in



Fig. 2. Classifications of WSNs detection procedures with mobile node

MWSNs, XED ignores the location information criteria for identifying the clone node. Indeed, XED applies ?challenge and remember? strategy for detecting the presence of the clone node. In fact, in the accepted strategy in XED, it has been supposed that the sensor node is equipped with a random number generator and has a unique identity. In this protocol when thes_i ands_j arrive at the communication domain of each other, any of them will produce the random numbers of r_{s_i} and r_{s_j} respectively and exchange them, then the received and sent numbers together with identities will be stored in any of the nodes. When s_i and s_j meet each other once again, at first the previous random numbers are exchanged and checked in any node, whether the received and stored numbers are equal or not. In this case if they are not the same, the clone intrusion is detected and node identity revoke message is broadcasted throughout the network. Otherwise, the random numbers are exchanged and replaced with the previous ones. It is observed that the algorithm has low memory overhead. But the detection probability is not high. Also, because of the communication and storage error, there is the probability of negative and positive errors. The results of simulation in section 5 prove this point. In addition, XED is vulnerable to smart attacker and collusion of the nodes.

3.1.2 Central clone detection procedure based on the criteria of speed. In [9], due to the fact that the majority of wireless nodes speed are limited, authors has defined speed threshold(V_{max}) as detection criteria. Central clone node intrusion detection procedure is proposed based on the location information for the MWSNs. In this paper because of the probability of increasing the positive and negative errors resulted by calculation error in measuring speed or lack of simultaneity among the nodes, SPRT mechanism is used. In fact the authors have proposed their procedures by assuming that the network nodes are aware of their location and RTM mobility model is used. Generally, in this procedure when the mobile sensor nodes reach the desired location, first by using localization protocols, positions are located and their claims $\langle ID, T_i, l_i, H(ID\|T_i\|l_i), Sig_i\rangle$are sent to their neighbors. Secondly the claim message is authenticated and Neighbors with the probability of p send claim to BS. After authentication of the node i message, the base station calculates the speed at the$i+1$ moment, by using C_i and C_{i+1} information and compares the results with V_{max} . Then this procedure assumes distribution as Bernoulli random variable and by calculating the logarithmic probability rate for n samples received claim of the node i , carries out the decision making process it. So when SPRT exceeds its higher bound, the clone node will be identified and the revocation message is broadcasts in the network.

3.1.3 Locally distributed clone node attack detection procedure, based on the time of exploiting the information on the compromised node. To replicate clone nodes from a certain node of the network, it needs to be separated from the network and then the information is exploited by spending times. In [16], by using this fact, the SDD procedure has been proposed for intrusion detection in MWSN. In reality the suggested solution in [16] is based on the fact that if node a does not meet node b twice in an λ interval, we can probably conclude that the node b has been separated from the network by the attacker to be replicated. The accuracy of SDD procedure depends on an interval with high probability that nodes may meet each other. Indeed, the detection takes place within a trade of detection time and rate of positive error. In SDD each node is considered as a witness for the rest of the network nodes and thus each node should send a message throughout the network for announcing its presence, which increases the communicative overhead and energy consumption. It is also observed that the detection probability of SDD is not high and to improve that, authors in [16] by using participation of the neighbors and exchanging the information of the joint nodes, proposed CDD procedure. New procedure increases the detection probability and decreases the negative error; but increases the communication overhead and memory. In [17] with an attitude different from [16] and regarding the fact that the number of the meets of two nodes in a certain interval with a high probability is restricted, EDD procedure is proposed. EDD procedure contains two phases; one of them is offline phase and deals with calculation of interval length and threshold of the meets of two nodes in a certain interval, and other one is online phase that deals with exchanging and comparing the messages of different nodes and detects node clone attack. By analyzing EDD, it is observed that this procedure is vulnerable to smart attacker, and also has high memory overhead. In order to solve the second problem, by using an exchange between the memory and the interval length, authors in[17] have proposed SEDD procedure. In SEDD each node analyzes only one set of nodes named monitor set and stores their messages; by doing this, the memory of the nodes is saved.

3.1.4 Locally-Distributed Detection procedure based on mobility. Authors in [14], for the purpose of the clone node detection in mobile wireless sensor network, proposed UTLTSE procedure based on mobility and awareness of the node location. In this procedure it is assumed that after the witness nodes receive time-location claim, instead of sending them, carry the claim all over the network and exchange the claims when the witness nodes meet each other. In fact, the important advantage of this protocol depends on movement of the nodes and indepen-

dence from downer layer routing protocol. In UTLSE protocol, each node is forced to trace a certain set of the nodes and all the witness nodes store only one location-time claim. So when witness nodes arrive at the radio domain of each other, exchange the claims and carry out the detection protocol. Of course it must be noted that in this procedure, the detection process is always done with smaller ID nodes. With meticulous analysis, it is observed that sometimes detection fails, because two witness nodes before they meet each other, they meet a third clone node. In order to solve this problem and increase the probability of detection, authors in [17], proposed MTLSD procedure, which benefits from ULTSE principles and uses of a queue with at least two lengths and the optimum of three lengths.

3.1.5 Locally Distributed detection procedure based on the list of the neighbors. In[11], by extending the routing problem with the help of mobility, authors proposed distributed intrusion detection procedure (SHD) for mobile wireless sensor network. Regarding that access to the location information is a strict hypothesis and the mobility models are different, SHD procedure dispenses with these two criteria. So SHD procedure uses the exchanging list of the neighbors among the mobile nodes and selects witness nodes for detection. This procedure is protected against the collusion of the attacker nodes. Generally, the detection process in SHD is based on sending the message of $\langle ID, neighbor - list \rangle$ to the nodes in its communication range. At the first time the protocol is performed and then uses question and answer method.

3.1.6 Centralized detection procedure based on key predistribution. Authors in [13], by using the pair-wise predistribution key and bloom filter have proposed a centralized detection procedure, which is independent from the location of wireless sensor nodes. Generally, by assuming that the base station is trusted, the server key method is applied and its confidentiality is always maintained. Then by using a two variable polynomial in $GF(p)$,unique confidentiality pair-wise key is produced and loaded on each node. Also In this procedure, to decrease communication costs, alongside server key method, bloom filter method is used. Then, in order to communicate with the neighboring nodes and by using functions and filters, each node produces a pair-wise key and shares it with the neighbors. In the next phase, each node sends a ciphering report to the BS containing its ID and CBF. After receiving all the reports, BS deciphers them and counts the number of created keys of each node. Regarding that, at first the keys have been distributed uniformly and the mobility model is RWM; the statistic of producing keys of legally nodes should be close to each other. Thus, if the number of keys of a node is more than the predetermined threshold, it can be concluded that the replicated node and the message of revoking it from network has been announced by BS.

3.2 Clone node detection procedure, for static sensor networks with mobile detector node

Regarding the limitation of energy consumption and high amount of communication overhead of detection procedures based on static nodes with progresses made in the technology of micro-robots, authors in [18], proposed a clone node detection procedure by using mobile wireless sensor nodes. In Patrol procedure the network model is considered as a combination of mobile and static nodes. Also it has been supposed that the static nodes have access to their location information. Regarding the attempt made by the attacker for compromising the static and patrol nodes and the possibility of presence of two mobile and static clone nodes, two criteria are introduced and utilized in the procedure: "each single node only is in one location in any moment" and "maximum speed of mobile node".
The Patrol procedure is based on assumption that for the purpose of providing a secured communication all of the static nodes require exchange of confidentiality information among static nodes with the patrol nodes. By moving throughout the network and inspecting the static nodes, Patrol nodes collect their claim. It is supposed that when the static node cannot communicate with the patrol in any round, the static node will be separated from the network in the next round. In addition, in [18] it is assumed that each static node is inspected by at least two patrol nodes in the network and any of them is considered as the reference node. In Patrol procedure, the static node detection is carried out by receiving the nodes location claims with the patrol node and analyzes the location conflict among the nodes with identical IDs. Under these circumstances, communication cost in comparison with the traditional detection procedures such as LSM [7] and RED [21] decreases greatly. Besides, for situations in which the attacker compromises the patrol nodes, the procedure uses the maximum speed criteria in central or distributed method and performs the detection by the static nodes.

3.3 Clone node detection procedure for static sensor networks with mobile attacker

Usually for attacking the network protocols like routing and clustering protocols, the attacker requires a large number of compromised nodes. For a lot of attackers it is hard and sometimes impossible to achieve this goal. Due to the above mentioned circumstances, if attacker uses mobile nodes and they become member in the list of different nodes neighbors at the time of preparing the list by the network nodes, the DDoS capability for the attacker is provided [4] . Since the static detection protocols are not able to detect the DDoS attacks, imposing limitations to the attacker is not a reasonable assumption to confront with the attacks made in the network. Therefore in [10] , authors proposed a distributed procedure to detect the mobile attacker node, it has been supposed that the network applies the traditional methods like RED and LSM to detect the static attacker. In fact [10] has used an unusual silence criterion of the neighboring node in order to detect the clone node and has established a procedure independent from the location information. Also to increase the precision of detection, SPRT technique has been utilized. Furthermore, the detection of the virtual mobile nodes is done by using RSSI technique.

4. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DETECTION PROCEDURES

In this section, about the necessity of non-deterministic and full distributed detection procedures will be discussed and then security requirements that should be fulfilled by the detection procedures will be investigated.

4.1 Selecting the type of protocol

First, the procedures with the highest distribution rate against the procedures having central controlling node is demonstrated. Usually the central controlling node (BS) decreases the complexity of the detection procedures as compared to distributed procedures [7]. But worse problem in centralized procedures is the presence of BS as the error point, which leads to the extreme decrease of the energy of the neighboring nodes compared to the other nodes networks, and also causes security threats in the network.
The next essential scrutiny is the analysis of the deterministic protocols in comparison with non-deterministic procedures. Because of the probability nature of non-deterministic protocols, attacking is difficult for any attacker [49]. In deterministic procedures, at the time of performing the protocol, the witness node protocols are considered unchangeable. Thus, if the enemy compromises and replicates a node and is in agreement with the witness nodes of that particular node, it can easily secure any number of the clone nodes. In this condition, the detection protocol

Table 1. Classification of node clone detection procedures

Procedure	NDFD	Resistance against smart attacker	Independent of location	Communication Cost	Memory Cost
XED[12]	Yes	No	Yes	$O(1)$	$O(\sqrt{n})$
SDD[16]	Yes	No	Yes	$O(1)$	$O(\sqrt{n})$
CDD[16]	Yes	No	Yes	$O(1)$	$O(\sqrt{n})$
EDD[17]	Yes	No	Yes	$O(1)$	$O(n)$
SEDD[17]	Yes	No	Yes	$O(1)$	$O(k)$
ULTSE[14]	No	No	No	$O(n)$	$O(\sqrt{n})$
MTLSD[14]	No	No	No	$O(n)$	$O(\sqrt{n})$
SPRT[9]	No	No	No	$O(n\sqrt{n})$	$O(1)$
SHD[11]	Yes	Yes	Yes	$O(\sqrt{n})$	$O(\sqrt{n})$
key Pre- Distribution[13]	No	No	Yes	$O(nlogn)$	$O(\sqrt{n})$
Patrol[18]	Yes	Yes	No	$O(n)$	$O(\sqrt{n})$
Mobile-adversary[10]	Yes	No	Yes	$O(n\sqrt{n})$	$O(n)$

is deficient. Therefore, an optimum procedure should be non-deterministic and full distributed (NDFD), so as to detect the clone node in the mobile WSN reliable. The classification of the procedures is presented in table(4.1) according to these criterions.

4.2 Requirements of clone node detection procedures

Considering the studies conducted in different papers [7]-[20], and the inherent characteristics of the WSNs and the capabilities of the attacker, the analysis and classification of different procedures have been carried out according to the below criteria:

(i) The procedure to be NDFD ;

(ii) The resistance capability against the smart attacker: in the smart attack, the enemy recognizes and inactivates the critical witness nodes (e.g. jamming). Thus, for stopping the enemy from training the critical witness nodes, a security requirement should be designed, which by the detection protocol is fulfilled. The requirement: in each round for a node, all the nodes must have the same probability in order to be a witness node. Besides, if the enemy is able to delete some of the nodes, it cannot obtain anything about the nodes that have high probability of being as witness nodes of a certain node;

(iii) Independent from the location information: Since the awareness of each node of its own location is a strict condition, to be independent from awareness location condition is important criteria of rationality of the detection procedure;

(iv) Communication and memory overhead: Regarding the extreme limitation of energy and hardware sources in WSNs, these criteria are also considered as an effective factor for rationality of the detection procedure;

In table (4.1), it is observed that the optimum procedure that could fulfill all the security requirements for MWSNs is the SHD procedure. Because SHD is independent from the location information and in comparison with other procedure for network with big dimensions has lower communication and memory overhead. But generally, communication and memory overhead are medium in the order $O(\sqrt{n})$. Therefore we can conclude that coming up with a full optimum procedure is one of the open discussions in this area; Besides, the need for presenting theoretical analyses and modeling in this area is extremely felt.

5. SIMULATION AND EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF THE DETECTION PROCEDURES

5.1 The principles of simulation

5.1.1 Simulation environment . Regarding the special characteristics of the WSNs, many papers have focused on analysis and classification of simulation software's of these networks [35]-[39]. Regarding criteria like, development capability, and being free, by investigating the common network simulator packages [35]-[38], the network simulator software "OMNeT4.2.2" has been selected for the purpose of performing the clone node detection procedures in WSNs with mobile node and comparative study. In simulation, to gain the highest similarity of real results, the protocol layers are in accordance with both IEEE802.15.4 [51] and IEEE82.11 standards and are separately simulated. For radio specifications, a real model "CC2420" the real radios of the name by Texas Instruments is utilized and unit disk mode is considered as propagation model. Beside, in simulation, the energy, memory and calculation power limitations have been considered. It is also supposed that the extent of the area, in which the WSN is performed, is area.

5.1.2 Sensor nodes mobility model. Till now lots of different models have been proposed for the mobility of wireless sensor nodes [43]. RTM and RWM could be mentioned as the most famous ones that are used in the WSNs with mobile nodes. Therefore, to simulate the mobility of sensor nodes, two models of RWM and RTM are considered and the simulation is performed by both of them. But we believe that RWM is much perfect. In RWM the mobility of a sensor node are independent from each other and after each node reaches its location, it remains there for a randomly chosen time from $[T_{min}, T_{max}]$ and then it randomly chooses a location in the network, and with randomly chosen speed from $[V_{min}, V_{max}]$ moves towards the chosen destination. Of course, it must be noted that by using RWM the average speed of the network decreases during the life of the network. And if



Fig. 3. Total consumed energy of difference procedures for detection one node replica

the least speed of the nodes is supposed to be zero, the average speed will converge at zero. To stop the occurrence of that, the least permitted speed should be regulated with more than zero. The details of RTM are similar to RWM. The only difference is the time of the presence of the mobile node in the destination which is the same for all the nodes and equals a fixed time. Then the minimum and the maximum permitted speed for the sensor nodes are supposed $1m/s$ and $20m/s$ respectively. Also the waiting interval for RTM model in the destination consider equals$20s$.

5.1.3 Cryptography mechanisms. In order to establish security against the cryptography common attacks as the first security layer, confidentiality and authentication mechanisms based on TinyECC[52] software package is utilized. Regarding the cost analysis carried out [53], in simulation, the hash function SHA-1 is used to provide the integrity of the nodes claims. Also digital signature algorithm ECDSA-160 is used for claims signing of each node. Which in accordance with [54], the cost of consumed energy used in ECDSA-160 for signing and confirming equals $22.83mj$ and $45.09mj$ respectively. Also the cost of calculating the checksum by SHA-1 is supposed to equal to $0.0059mj$.

5.2 Results of simulation

To compare the performance and capability replica node detection approaches in WSNs, criteria presented in Table (2) is used. Simulation results using repeated averaging over 1000 simulations for each approach the implementations are presented. The comparison between different approaches are taken and plotted in Figures 3-5.

5.2.1 Energy cost. Energy and resource constraints are the most important limiting factor affecting the performance of the proposed protocols for WSNs. So a good replica node detection approach should have appropriate energy overhead. To evaluate the energy overhead of different approaches, the simulation results for different network configurations plotted in Fig.(3). Form Fig.(3), it is obvious that, generally collision based approaches are dealing with lower power overhead. It should also be noted that though we initially think that SPRT approach has lower energy overhead due to centralized, simulation results show that SPRT energy overhead is higher than the distributed approach; because the energy overhead of digital signature in SPRT is very high.

5.2.2 Clone detection probability . Node replica detection procedures must have a high probability of node replication detection [2]. Moreover, in the optimal approach, the detection probability should be independent of the network physical characteristics such as sensor network configuration and the number of



Fig. 4. Detection probability of difference procedures verse change number of nodes



Fig. 5. false alarm rate of difference procedures verse change number of nodes

sensor nodes. Figure (4) represents the simulation result of the replica node detection probability for different approaches, when there is only one clone node in the network. From Fig.(4) it is observed that for networks with a little number of nodes, detection probability of procedures is acceptable. Also it is observed that detection probability in collision based approaches (like XED, and SDD) with increasing size of networks are reduced, because location of nodes change continuously; therefore routing overhead and packet loss are increased.
In addition, Fig.(4), illustrates that the SPRT has the highest probability of detection and minimal change with increasing number of network nodes. The result is admissible because SPRT is a centralized approach and uses location information.

5.2.3 False alarm rate. According to the simulation results of different approaches, it can be seen that replica node detection in most procedures have a false detect, indeed they consider a number of legitimate nodes as attacker replica nodes. Therefore for performance comparison of different procedures, a false positive rate criterion is used in the simulation. In Fig.(5) false alarm rates versus number of network nodes are plotted. From Fig.(5) it is observed that with increasing the number of nodes in the speed based detection procedures (such as SPRT), false alarm rate is increased due to the measurement error. Also in the collision based

Table 2. Performance Metrics for simulation

Performance Metrics	Description
Total consumed energy(E_d)	The sum of communication and computation costs consumed by all nodes to detect a clone
Clone detection probability(P_d)	The probability of successful detection
False alarm error (e_{FA})	Major detection error measured in mobile WSNs, which may deteriorate the quality of clone detection schemes due to costly false detection with regard to the high clone detection ratio

procedures (such as EDD), because of the reduced possibility of nodes meeting and communication link failure, false alarm rate increases. It is also observed that for XED procedure, at first the error rate is high, but with increasing network size it decreases; its reason is that, Based on simulation, XED is not able to detect node replication in large networks.

6. CONCLUSION

In this paper all procedures presented for the detection of replica node attacks in sensor networks with mobile nodes is reviewed and analysis. Also, by using mobility criteria, a new classification for node replica detection procedures and attacker model are proposed. To compare and evaluate different procedures, different metrics are introduced and used for theoretical analysis and classification procedures. Moreover, results of theoretical analysis and metrics are used for assessment procedures. Then, for a realistic assessment with considering different network layer protocols and constraints WSN, simulation and experimental analysis is done. Finally, the theoretical analysis and simulation results of the performance of different approaches are discussed. Analysis results demonstrate that the procedures, based on location information (UTLSE, MTLSD, and SPRT) have a higher detection rate and low false alarm rate. But, here are two important notices; first, generally, due to the constraints of WSNs, access location information for all nodes is a strict assumption. Moreover, it can be seen that the energy overhead in this approach is too high. Therefore, regarding the simulation and theoretical analysis it can be seen that the SHD largely meets the criteria for a suitable solution and also shows good performance. However SHD energy consumption in large-scale WSNs still is high. Therefore, regarding limitations WSN, to achieve an optimal solution for node replica detection, there is an open area for researchers.

7. REFERENCES

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