An Unobservable On-demand Routing Protocol with Trust Management Mechanism

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ABSTRACT

Mobile ad hoc network(MANET) is highly challenging network environment due to its own properties like open medium, dynamic topology, distributed cooperation, and capability constraint. MANET is self-directed and infrastructure less network. As network is wireless, routing plays an important part in the security of the whole system. Secure transmission of data in between nodes is an imperative concern. Any attacker get remote node by using transceiver and without being caught. The objective of this paper is to propose new secure unobservable routing protocol with trust management mechanism, where attacker gets blocked while making spoofing or eavesdropping attacks. Only unobservable message could be gathered by attacker. An USOR protocol is implemented on ns2 with its performance is evaluated by comparing with AODV and AMODV. The proposed protocol will also protect privacy information among network and will detect and block compromised nodes through trust-aware routing framework.

General Terms

Security, secure transmission, routing, wireless ad hoc network, spoofing, dynamic topology.

Keywords

Eavesdropping attack, secure unobservable routing protocol, Trust mechanism, trust-aware routing framework.

1. INTRODUCTION

Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) represent an innovative technology used for monitoring specific environments. A wireless adhoc network is collection of thousands of tiny wireless sensor nodes for data communication purpose. These sensor nodes coordinate with one another to fulfill information transmission. Numerous applications built in WSN are security, inventory tracking, automotive control, surveillance, health monitoring and other civil tasks, bridge monitoring, home automation in the recent years. Sensors are modest, low power gadgets, which have restricted assets.

Figure 1 shows system architecture of Mobile Ad-hoc Network. Every node contains a power unit, a processing units, a storage units, sensing unit and wireless transmitter. The mobile nodes intercommunicate with each other through simultaneous transmission of data from one node to another node. As the transmitter has limited range, data must be forwarded through multiple host in order to reach remote node which is at long distance from originating source node.



Figure 1: Mobile Ad-hoc Network

1.1 Privacy Preserving Security Parameters in MANET

- ***Anonymity[1],[2]*** is the state of being not identifiable within a set of subjects, the anonymity set i. e. Hiding source of data.
- ***Unlinkability[1],[2]*** of two or more (Identity of Intrest)IOIs means these IOIs are no more or no less related from the attacker's view i. e. Hiding actual contents of data.
- ***Unobservability[1],[2]*** of an IOI is the state that whether it exists or not is indistinguishable to all unrelated subjects, and subjects related to this IOI are anonymous to all other related subjects.

1.2 Problem Description

The main objective is to study and implement a new unobservable secure on demand routing protocol(USOR) for providing anonymity, unlikability and unobservability to dicover and block attacking nodes by using Trust-Aware Routing Framework in mobile adhoc network (MANET).

1.3 USOR Objectives

The key objectives of USOR protocol are,

- To make Sender, intermediate and destination node not identifiable in network
- To protect Link Information
- To collect only unobserved message by attacker
- To protect nodes which get easily compromised by attacks by privacy preserving routing protocol.
- To discover and block assaulting nodes through trust mechanism.

1.4 Problem Identification

Numerous privacy-preserving routing schemes have been proposed. And the issues in current anonymous routing protocols are listed below:

- Current anonymous routing protocols mainly consider anonymity and partial unlinkability in MANET.
- Complete unlinkability and unobservability are not guaranteed due to partial content protection.
- Present schemes encounters source traceback attacks as information like packet type and sequence number etc. can be used to relate two packets, which cracks unlinkability.
- An insight on utilizing which key for unscrambling should be provided in each encoded packet, which demands careful design to eliminate linkability.

To provide strong privacy in MANET, unobervable secure on-demand routing protocol must provide Content Unobservability and Traffic Pattern Unobservability.

- **Content Unobservability[2]** : Adversary never obtain useful information from content of any message. It can be achieved by using novel combination of group signature and ID based encryption.
- **Traffic Pattern Unobservability[2] :** Adversary unable to achieve useful information from recurrence, length, and sender- receiver patterns of message traffic. It can be achieved by incorporating traffic padding.

2. RELATED WORK

There are number of anonymous routing schemes available in ad hoc network which provide various levels of privacy protection at different cost. Most of them rely on public key cryptosystems (PKC) to attain anonymity and unlinkability in routing. Extensive computation overhead introduced due to expensive PKC operations.

The ANODR protocol proposed by Kong et al. [3] is the first to give anonymity and unlinkability for directing in ad hoc network. ANODR is using one-time public/private key pairs to achieve anonymity and unlinkability which is based on Onion Routing which is used for route discovery but design of ANODR unable to acheive unobservability. The PKC encryption/decryption and one-time public/private key pairs generation in ANODR increases the computation overhead for mobile nodes in ad hoc network.

One-time public/private key pairs are used by ASR [6], ARM [8], AnonDSR [9] and ARMR [4] to attain anonymity and unlinkability. The design of ASR[6] is made to achieve stronger privacy location that that of ANODR[3] as nodes on route are not having any information of their distance to the source/destination node. ARM[8] is used to reduce computation overhead on one-time public/private key pair generation.

Secure distributed anonymous routing (SDAR)[11] scheme proposed by A. Boukerche, K. El-Khatib, L. Xu, and L. Korba is working with long-term public/private key pairs at each node for anonymous communication. It is more scalable to network size and having large computation overhead.

On-demand anonymous routing (ODAR)[12] scheme proposed by D. Sy, R. Chen, and L. Bao yields only identity anonymity. It is not providing unlinkability for MANET, since the whole RREQ/RREP packets are not secured with session keys.

An anonymous location-aided routing scheme (ALARM)[5] proposed by K. E. Defrawy and G. Tsudik is using combination of public key cryptography and the group signature to conserve privacy. Privacy preserving feature is provided by group signature where everyone can verify a group signature but cannot get information of who is the signer. But ALARM outflows information like location of node and topology used in network.

To condense, public key cryptosystems have a best asymmetric feature, and it is appropriate for protection insurance in MANET. Most of anonymous routing schemes proposed for MANET are using public key cryptosystems to guard privacy. Only anonymity and unlinkability is provided by present schemes and unobservability is not yet considered and employed.

3. USOR PROTOCOL

3.1 Assumptions and Dependencies

This USOR protocol is using novel combination of group signature scheme and the ID-based encryption scheme.

- Both the group signature scheme and the ID-based scheme are based on pairing of elliptic curve groups of order of a large prime (e.g. 170-bit long), so that they have the same security strength as the 1024-bit RSA algorithm.
- All nodes in the network should have the same communication range, and each node can move around within the network.
- A node can communicate with other nodes within its transmission range, and these nodes are called its neighbors.
- For nodes outside of one's transmission range, one has to communicate via a multi-hop path.
- The ad hoc network is all connected i.e. each node has at least one neighbor.
- No node is totally surrounded by compromised nodes.

3.2 Modules

The process has been isolated into following three modules,

- *Key Generation*
- Group Signature Scheme.

- ID-based Encryption Scheme.

- *Anonymous Key Establishment*
- *Privacy-Preserving Route Discovery*
  - Route Request.
  - Route Reply.
  - Attack Analysis.
  - Data Transmission.
- Trust-Aware Routing Framework

- *Key Generation*

In group signature scheme, each member of group is allowed to sign a message on behalf of the group. The key server produces a group public key PUgp which is publicly known by everyone. It generates a private group signature key PRx for each node X. ID-based encryption is a type of public-key encryption where the public key of a user is unique data about the identity of the user, which enabled users to validate digital signatures using only public information such as the user's identifier.

- *Anonymous Key Establishment*

Figure 2. Shows Anonymous Key Establishment[2] with its neighbours. Figure 3. shows flow chart for Anonymous Key Establishment. Here, each node in ad hoc network interact with its direct neighbours inside its radio extent for anonymous key establishment.



Figure 2: Anonymous Key Establishment

- **S → *** : $r_S P$, $SIG_{gsks}(r_S P)$
- **X → S** : $r_X P$, $SIG_{gsks}(r_X P)$, $E_{kSX}(k_{X*})$
- **S → X** : $E_{kSX}(k_{S*})$



Figure 3: Anonymous Key Establishment Flowchart

- *Route Request*

S selects a random number rS, and uses the identity of node D to encode a trapdoor information that only can be opened with D's private IDbased key, which yields ED(S,D, rSP). S then chooses a sequence number seqno for this route request, and another random number NS as the route pseudonym, which is used as the index to a specific route entry.

Each node also maintains a temporary entry in his routing table

(seqno,Prev_RNym,Next_RNym,Prev_hop,Next_hop),

Where, seqno is the route request, sequence number,

Prev_RNym is route pseudonym of previous hop,

Next_RNym is the route pseudonym of next hop,

Prev_hop is the upstream node

Next_hop is the downstream node along the route.

nonce is an arbitrary number used only once in a cryptographic communication.



Figure 4: Route Request

- $Nonce_S$, Nym_S , $E_{KS*}(RREQ,N_S,E_D(D, S, r_S P),seqno)$
- $Nonce_A$, Nym_A , $E_{KA*}(RREQ,N_A,E_D(D, S, r_S P),seqno)$
- $Nonce_C$, Nym_C , $E_{KC*}(RREQ,N_C,E_D(D, S, r_S P),seqno)$

- *Route Reply*

After node D realizes that he is the destination node, he starts to prepare a reply message to the source node. For route reply messages[2], unicast message is used to save communication cost.

D selects a random number r_D and generate a ciphertext

ES(D, S, r_SP, r_DP) showing that he is the valid destination capable of opening the trapdoor information.

When C obtains the above message from D, he determines who is the sender of the message by evaluating the equation $Nym_{CD} = H3(k_{CD}|Nonce_D)$. So he uses the correct key k_{CD} to decrypts the ciphertext, then he finds out route corresponding to RREP message according to the route pseudonym N_C and seqno. C then searches his route table and modifies the temporary entry $(seqno,N_B,N_C,B,-)$ into $(seqno,N_B,N_C,B,D)$.

At the end, C chooses a new nonce $Nonce_C$, computes

$$Nym_{BC} = H_3(k_{BC}|Nonce_C)$$

sends the following message to B:

$$(Nonce_C, Nym_{BC}, E_{kBC}(RREP, N_B, E_S(D,S,r_SP,r_DP), seqno)$$



Figure 5: Route Reply

- $Nonce_D, Nym_{CD}, EK_{CD}(RREP, NC, E_S(D,S,r_SP,r_DP), seqno)$
- $Nonce_C, Nym_{BC}, EK_{BC}(RREP, N_B, E_S(D,S,r_SP,r_DP), seqno)$
- $Nonce_A, Nym_{SA}, EK_{SA}(RREP, N_S, E_S(D, S, r_SP, r_DP), seqno)$

- *Unobservable Data Transmission*

After the source node S successfully searches a route to the destination node D, S can begin to send unobservable data transmission[2] under the protection of pseudonyms and keys. Node A comes to know that this message is for him according to the pseudonym Nym_{SA} after receiving the above message from S. After deciphering using the correct key, A identifies that this message is a data packet and should be forwarded to B by looking at value of route pseudonym N_S. Hence he prepares and forwards the following packet to B:

$$Nonce_A, Nym_{AB}, E_{kAB}(DATA, N_A, seqno, E_{kSD}(payload))$$



Figure 6: Data Transmission

4. PROPOSED SCHEME

Trust Aware Routing Framework (TARF)[15] is used with USOR[2] while evaluating path towards valid destination. It identifies adversaries by their low trustworthiness and routes data through paths preventing those intruders to achieve adequate throughput. It uses following components:

- ***Neighbour*** *:* For node S, neighbouring node of S is reachable form S by only one hop wireless transmission.
- ***Trust Level*** *:* For node S, trust level of neighbour is decimal number in [0, 1], showing node S's view of neighbor's level of trustworthiness. The trust level of node is probability that neighbour of this node correctly deliver data to destination and denoted by T.
- ***Energy cost*** : For node N, the energy cost of a neighbor is the average energy cost to successfully deliver unit-sized data packet with this neighbor as its next-hop node, from N to the destination. Energy cost is denoted as E.

4.1 Trust Manager

TrustManager[15],[16] is responsible for deciding the trust level of each neighbor based on discovery of network loop. For each neighbor b of S, TSb denotes the trust level of b in S's neighborhood table.

First of all, each neighbor is given a neutral trust level. After any of those occasions happens, the individual neighbors' trust levels are altered. Trust manager sways a node to pick an alternate path when its present path as often as possible neglects to convey data to the base station.

Figure 7 shows an example to illustrate how TrustManager works Here, node A, B, C and D are all honest nodes and not compromised by adversaries. Node A is having node B as its current next-hop node while node B is having an attacker node as its next-hop node. The attacker node declines every packet received and hense any data packet passing through node A will not reach destination. Eventually, node A finds that the data packets it sent did not get conveyed. The Trust manager on node A begins to reduction the trust level of its present next-hop node B despite the fact that hub B is honest hub. Once that trust level results too low, node A decides to select node C as its new next-hop node. In this way node A find out a better and successful route (A - C - D - base).



Figure 7: An illustratation of how TrustManager works

Further, concerning the stability of routing path, once a valid node identifies a trustworthy honest neighbor as its next-hop node, it has a tendency to keep that next-hop choice without considering other apparently appealing nodes, for example, a fake base station. This tendency is due to both the preference to maintain stable routes and highly trustable nodes.

4.2 Energy Watcher

The EnergyWatcher[15] on a node observes energy consumption of one-hop transmission to its neighbors and collects energy cost reports from those neighbors to maintain energy cost entries in its neighborhood table.

A node N's EnergyWatcher computes the energy cost E_{Nb} for its neighbor b in N's neighborhood table and decides its own energy cost E_N as follows,

$$E_{Nb} = E_{N->b} + E_b$$

Where,

E_{Nb} is the average energy cost of successfully delivering a unit-sized data packet from N to the base station, with b as N's next-hop node.

$E_{N->b}$ is average energy cost of successfully delivering a data packet from N to its neighbor b with one hop.

E_b is nodes own broadcast energy cost.

5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The performance of USOR[2] is evaluated in terms of throughput, packet delivery ratio(PDR), average energy, control overhead and normalized control bytes.

The ability of the proposed attack free on-demand unobservable routing protocol is confirmed via series of simulation experiments using NS-2. The number of nodes are established randomly with each node representing the individual router.

In simulation, 8 nodes are randomly distributed in network field having size of 1500mx300m rectangle field. Mobile nodes are moving by making use of random way point model. The average speed range is from 2 to 8m/s.

By using USOR protocol it has been observed that speed remains constant with packet delivery ratio as shown in figure 8



Figure 8 : Speed Vs PDR

Figure 9 shows as speed increases delay of data transfer between nodes decreases by using USOR.



Figure 9 : Speed Vs Delay

Figure 10 shows as speed increases throughput remains constant by using USOR protocol. The USOR protocol has given high throughput by making use of trust management component. It allows this protocol to select stable and reliable path to destination and hence help to improve throughput.



Figure 10 : Speed Vs Normalized Overhead

Figure 11 shows as speed increases average energy of each nodes decreases by using USOR. The energy watcher component is taking care of minimum average energy required to transmit data packets in network



Figure 11 : Speed Vs Avg. Energy

5.1 Comparision With Existing Protocols

This new proposed USOR protocol can be compared with existing AODV[7] and AMODV[25] protocol in terms of packet delivery ratio, delay, Throughput and control overhead. This comparision shows that USOR is giving best performance in terms of all above parameters as follows :

- *Packet Delivery Ratio(PDR)*

Figure 12 compares packet delivery ratio of USOR with existing AODV and AMODV protocol. As USOR is satisfying anonymity, unlinkability and unoservability hence it is having very high packet delivery ration as compared with AODV and AMODV.



Figure 12 : PDR Comparision

- *Delay*

It is average time taken by data packet to reach the destination. Figure 13 shows that USOR having least delay as compared with both existing protocols because of trust management and energy watcher componants.



Figure 13 : Delay Comparision

- *Throughput*

Throughput is the number of successfully received packets in a unit time and it is represented in bps. Figure 14 shows that USOR is providing highest throughput than that of AODV and AMODV protocols as speed increases from 2 to 8 m/s.



Figure 14 : Throughput Comparision

- *Control Overhead*

It is ratio of the control information sent to the actual data received at each node. Figure 15 shows that control overhead provided by USOR is greater than that of

existing AMODV and AODV protocols.

Figure 15 : Control_Overhead Comparision

6. CONCLUSION

An unobservable on-demand routing protocol USOR is based on novel combination of group signature and ID-based cryptosystem for ad hoc networks. The outline of USOR offers strong privacy protection, complete unlinkability, and content unobservability for ad hoc networks. This proposed new USOR with trust management enable node to keep track of trustworthiness of its own neighbours by selecting reliable route towards destination/base station. Hence, this proposed protocol effectively protect WSNs from severe attacks like blackhole attack[7], sinkhole attack[7], collude attack[2] and eavesdropping attacks. The security examination exhibits that USOR not just gives solid protection assurance, additionally more safe against assaults because of node compromise. This protocol implemented on ns2 which is used to examine performance of USOR. Results demonstrates that USOR has agreeable execution in terms of packet delivery ratio, delay, average energy, throughput and normalized control bytes.

7. FUTURE SCOPE

This proposed USOR protocol protect network against Blackhole, Sinkhole, and Eavesdropping attacks. So, future scope will be to defend network against Wormhole attack which is not possible by using this proposed protocol. Also USOR need some improvements in removing denial of service (DOS) attack. This protocol uses novel combination of group signature and ID-based cryptosystem for ad hoc networks, it requires key generation and verification at every node in route discovery phase. This will incur additional preproseccing overhead on network . So, future work will be to reduce this overhead by using some enhanced security configuration.

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